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Non-technical summary
Recent decades have seen a shift in academic research towards the 'entrepreneurial university' model. Researchers are encouraged to actively participate in innovation through channels such as academic patenting, joint work with industry, or academic entrepreneurship. Besides obvious benefits of technology transfer and increased funding at research institutions through industry collaborations, scholars have expressed concerns that the shift towards entrepreneurial universities may entail negative implications for the rate and direction of academic research. Examples include trade-offs between publishing and patenting, academic entrepreneurship and the 'brain drain' in academia, the dissemination of research results, and the withholding of information, data and materials on which research is based.
In this paper, we focus on how extramural and in particular industry funding of academic research affect academics' sharing behavior. Our research builds on a broad individual-level dataset of German academics. In the regressions we disentangle total extramural funding received from funding that comes specifically from industry sponsors and find that, controlling for personal characteristics, research characteristics, institutional affiliations, and scientific fields, scientists who receive external funding from any source are more likely to be denied access to others' research results or materials. Those who receive industry funding are more likely to deny others' requests for access. These results reflect the changes in incentives of researchers to disclose as funding moves towards the private sector. Our results have implications for both science institutions and funding bodies.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
In den vergangenen Jahren haben sich viele öffentliche Forschungseinrichtungen in zunehmendem 
Introduction
Recent decades have seen a shift in academic research towards the 'entrepreneurial university' model. Researchers are encouraged to actively participate in innovation through channels such as academic patenting, joint work with industry, or academic entrepreneurship (Etzkowitz, 2003) . Besides obvious benefits of technology transfer and increased funding at research institutions through industry collaborations, scholars have expressed concerns that the shift towards entrepreneurial universities may entail negative implications for the rate and direction of academic research. Examples include trade-offs between publishing and patenting (Azoulay et al., 2009) , academic entrepreneurship and the 'brain drain' in academia (Toole and Czarnitzki, 2010; Aghion et al., 2008) , the dissemination of research results (Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Blumenthal et al., 1996a,b; Cohen et al., 1998; Gans and Murray, 2011; Thursby and Thursby, 2007) , and the withholding of information, data and materials on which research is based (Walsh et al., 2007; Haeussler, 2011; Haeussler et al., 2014) .
This paper seeks to contribute to the latter stream of research. Sharing data and material inputs to research is one of the cornerstones of scientific progress since it allows replication, validation and the cumulative advance of knowledge in a field. Data and research materials are also a major source of scientific misconduct. One prominent case is the South Korean scientist Woo-Suk Hwang and his colleagues who published an article in Science in 2005 claiming to have isolated embryonic stem cells from a cloned human embryo (Hwang et al., 2005) . Scientists immediately started research to build on these highly exciting findings.
However, the published results turned out to be fabricated, and the paper was retracted less than a year later (Azoulay et al., 2012 (Blumenthal et al. 1996a,b; Cohen et al. 1998; Gans and Murray 2011; Thursby and Thursby 2007) . This could hamper scientific research, as the public disclosure of research results limits a duplication of research, and facilitates replication and follow-up research (Dasgupta and David 1994).
Our research builds on a broad individual-level dataset of German academics.
Germany experienced the largest growth in industry sponsorship of academic research (13.4 percentage points between 1995 and 2007) among developed countries, making it especially suitable for this investigation. Moreover, our data allow us to provide evidence for a broad set of scientific disciplines while prior research is largely confined to the bio sciences which are characterized by all kinds of peculiarities in research conduct and funding compared to other disciplines (e.g., Haeussler, 2011; Haeussler et al., 2014 business, scientists in fields with higher degrees of competition, and scientists with higher publication outputs were more likely to remain unfulfilled. However, the authors found no significant effect of the requesting scientist's industry funding.
Haussler (2011) reports the likelihood with which scientists in industry and academe share information, using a survey of bioscientists in Germany and the United Kingdom.
Academic scientists reported providing 85% of the requested information, while industry researchers reported to have provided 58%. The share of information exchanged further depends negatively on its competitive value, the expected level of reciprocity (positively, but only among industrial researchers), social factors (norms regarding information sharing and entrepreneurs in the scientists' family), the type of enquirer, and the degree to which the requested information is protected by non-disclosure agreements.
Haeussler et al. (2014) (Blumenthal et al. 1986 (Blumenthal et al. , 1996a (Blumenthal et al. , 1997 (Blumenthal et al. , 2006 Campbell et al. 2000 Campbell et al. , 2002 . These studies find that researchers with industry sponsored projects are more likely to report industry ownership of results, pre-publication review, publication delays, and secrecy. Czarnitzki et al. (2011) . This increase is strongest in experimental biology where the share of scientists concerned with secrecy has skyrocketed from 55% to 87%. The authors then show that having industry funding relates to higher levels of increased secrecy, as does having stronger scientific competition.
The above overview suggests extramural and particularly industry funding to be related to the likelihood that scientists will share their data and material inputs and to the likelihood that scientists themselves will deny others access to their inputs. In the following, we seek to provide empirical evidence based on a comprehensive sample of German academics in order to elucidate the relationship between funding and sharing behavior.
Data and Methods
We use data from an online survey of German academic researchers performed by the Centre We test the representativeness of our sample by comparing it to the population distribution of public research scientists across institutional categories (universities versus PROs) and disciplines obtained from the Federal Statistical Office. The official and sample shares are presented in Table 1 . While the sample is reasonably representative of the population, there are some small differences. Our sample has 8% more scientists employed in public research 1 These institutes are major actors in German science, and have many branches across disciplines. For example, the Fraunhofer society has 17,000 employees in 59 institutes. The other science organizations are of comparable size. It is common for German university professors to head research groups at these institutes. 2 The large discrepancy here is caused in part by many researchers filling in only few questions. Only 1,400 scientists considered all questions in the survey. As these still had some item non-response, we had to exclude part of the sample.
organizations than the population. The sample also contains 5% more life scientists, 2.4% fewer science/humanities researchers, and 1.8% fewer natural scientists than the population.
To ensure the robustness of our results, we re-estimated the regression models presented in section 4 adjusting for any bias caused by field or institute sampling through population weights based on eight institute-field strata (see table A.1 in appendix). The results are highly similar to those of the un-weighted sample.
- Table 1 about here
The dependent variables are derived from two survey questions regarding the disclosure of research materials to colleagues. The first one asks "Have you requested any research results (such as software, genetic sequences, data), and/or research materials since 2002 from other scientists but did not get access?". Table 2 shows summary statistics. Respondents could check boxes "yes", "no", or "not specified". 139 respondents, or 17% of the sample, indicated that they had requested results or materials but did not receive them. - Table 2 about here
We control in the analysis for research characteristics, personal characteristics, scientific domains, and institutional affiliations. Research characteristics include the individual's position at the institution, the number of publications and patent applications, and the number of scientists employed at the respondent's institute who work on similar topics. The latter serves as a proxy for the degree of scientific competition of the field, as greater scientific competition associates with higher levels of secrecy (Hong and Walsh, 2009; Haeussler, 2011) . Personal characteristics are age, gender, and whether the scientist is tenured. In terms of domains, the researchers were grouped in four broad fields consisting of life sciences, natural sciences, engineering, and social sciences. Institutional affiliations include universities, the four large public research associations (Fraunhofer, Max-Planck, Helmholtz and Leibniz), and a residual group of other affiliations (these include public research institutes which are financed by the states and not the federal government, for instance). 3 All these variables have been collected in the survey. In order to check the reliability of the information provided in the survey, we also gathered the publication and patent data from external databases (the ISI Web of To examine the relation between third-party and industry funding and the disclosure of research results and materials, we specify Probit models. Since the descriptive statistics suggest being denied access and denying access to be related, we also specify a Bivariate Probit model to account for any error term correlation between the equations of being denied access and denying access to others. Table 3 presents the regression results. We first estimate a Probit model for 'Being denied access by others' (column 1). Other factors equal, scientists who received third party funding are more likely to have been denied access to others' research results and materials. The magnitude of the marginal effect is also sizeable: other factors at the mean, the probability of being denied access increases from 14% to 21% if the dummy indicating third party funding switches from zero to unit value. Receiving funding specifically from industry and the other research characteristics do not have significant effects. In line with previous studies (e.g.
Results
Hong and Walsh 2009), we observe that scientists in the life sciences are more likely to be denied access.
-------------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here
Concerning the equation on 'Denying access' (column 2), we find no significant effect of third-party funding. This indicates that extramural funding in general, including funding from
German or European government organizations, does not hamper the direct dissemination of
Science and the PATSTAT patent database). Although the numbers did not match exactly, the results do not depend on the source of the data (survey vs. publication/patent databases). This test of data reliability makes us confident that also the other variables are quite accurately reported by the scientists. Note that the results reported below are obtained by using the externally collected patent and publication data.
results and materials to others. However, the coefficient of receiving industry funding is positive and significant. The size of the marginal effect is large: other factors at the mean, receiving industry funding increases the probability of denying access from 5% to 10%. The switch from no industry contracts to having industry funding thus doubles the likelihood of keeping research materials secret.
Column 3 jointly estimates both equations in a Bivariate Probit model taking the correlation between the error terms into account. The error term correlation is positive (ρ = 0.5) and significant (LR test on correlation being zero: χ²(1) = 27.18, p-value < 0.01). We thus conclude that a random shock resulting in being denied access to material also translates into the reaction of denying access to others and vice versa. The results concerning the coefficient estimates model are very similar to the univariate Probit models.
We interpret our findings as follows: the result that researchers who have industry funding are more likely to deny access to research materials might, in line with the literature, reflect clauses in the contracts with industry sponsors that the research has to be kept secret (at least for a certain amount of time) so that the industry sponsor can appropriate possible commercial returns afterwards. In addition, the scientist might realize that she or he possesses a monopoly in a certain domain and that this could not only be profitable for the institution regarding research budgets but also privately profitable, be it either supplemental remuneration by the public research institution for attracting outside funding or other private consulting contracts. Since the result in the 'Deny access' equation is only found for the industry dummy and not for the extramural funding in general, it is plausible to assume that contract clauses imposed by the industry partners are the main reason for not sharing materials. As this strongly contradicts the paradigm of open science the trend towards entrepreneurial universities should not be celebrated for improved technology transfer without caution as, in the extreme, it threatens the trust, credibility (because of impossible replication of results) and the evolution of science, and thus also technological progress in the long-run.
When we consider the results for the likelihood to be denied access to research materials it turns out that industry funding is not of particular importance. Instead we find that scientists with extramural research funding in general are more likely to be denied access. We attribute this finding to the fact that these scientists might conduct research in domains that are more competitive than the topics that are being investigated by people that did not rely on extramural research funding. While funding processes are usually merit-based and highly credentialed scientists are more likely to secure such funding (Grimpe, 2012) , our result do not suggest, however, that being denied access or denying access is connected to the scientists' individual research productivity in terms of publications and patents. In that sense, we do not find the two outcomes to be particularly salient for "star" versus "non-star"
scientists.
Before we conclude, note that we also re-estimate the models using linear probability models (LPMs) rather than Probit models. While the LPM assumes constant marginal effects over the distribution of the regressors and could produce predictions that are not bound between zero and one, it, unlike the Probit model, does not require the normality assumption which, if violated, could lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates in the Probit model. All the findings reported above were very similarly found using the LPMs and therefore we do not report these in more detail here.
Also note that we tested for heterogeneity of the identified effects across scientific fields. Neither of these tests showed significant differences. This is noteworthy as most existing research focuses on the life sciences. We find that the relationship between extramural/industry funding and the access to research materials does not significantly differ between life sciences, natural sciences, engineering and social sciences. Admittedly, our field definitions are quite broad because of our limited sample size. More research could be devoted to the heterogeneity across fields in order to further investigate this issue.
Conclusion
Using a comprehensive and cross-discipline dataset on German academics, we provide evidence that industry sponsorship relates to increased denial of requests for research results and materials while extramural funding in general is related to scientists experiencing denial of access themselves. Hence, our research contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we connect research on academics' sharing behavior with the literature that studies the implications of extramural and particularly industry funding on the disclosure of academic research. In that sense, we complement other research on the relation between industry funding and disclosure, which argues that industry sponsorship can harm the public disclosure of academic research (Czarnitzki et al., 2011; Blumenthal et al. 1986 Blumenthal et al. , 1996a Blumenthal et al. , b, 1997 Blumenthal et al. , 2006 Campbell et al. 2000 , 2002 , Hong and Walsh, 2007 Walsh et al. 2007 ).
Second, prior research has largely focused on university scientists the bio sciences.
Our study broadens the results obtained in prior research by considering a more general sample of scientific disciplines and institutions. We show that limited sharing as a result of extramural funding is not only a phenomenon apparent only in the bio sciences but instead a broad problem. This is further illustrated in the regression tables provided in appendix table
A.2, where we estimate the probability to deny access to others in and outside of the life sciences. The effect is present in both, even though the marginal effect of industry funding is much higher in the life sciences (industry funding more than quadruples the probability of denying funding to others from 2% to 9% in the life sciences, compared with a doubling from 5% to 10% outside of the life sciences).
An implication of our findings is that scientific institutions may need to consider policies that govern the sharing behavior of scientists in order to assure the opportunity to replicate, validate and cumulatively advance the knowledge in the field. Our results also stress that these policies need to be encompassing in the sense that they do not only pertain to Tables   Table 1 German academic scientist population and sample in parentheses. *(,**,***): p < 0.1 (p < 0.05, p < 0.01). Probit models. Reference categories for the dummy variables: male, non group leader, untenured, employed at a university. Column 2: reference field: social scientist..
